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Introduction 
With the collapse of the developing countries' access to the 
international financial markets, the sharp reduction in the flows 
of foreign financial assistance in the 1980s, and the sudden end 
of the cheap credit era, the mobilization of these countries' un-
tapped domestic savings potential is no longer an exclusively ac-
ademic question. For many of these countries, an improvement of 
the volumes and quality of their domestic savings and investment 
activities is one of the most important ingredients in their eco-
nomic recovery programs. Moreover, a growing consensus has been 
emerging about the opportunities for achieving these goals with 
the mobilization of deposits through financial intermediaries in 
the rural areas [Adams <1983>, Bhatt, Dell'Amore, Ferrari and 
Mauri, Fischer, Gonzalez-Vega <1985>, Holst, Mittendorf, Ohlin, 
Poyo <1986>, Vogel, Wachtel, and many others]. 
As with many other economic controversies, however, espe-
cially those about arrangements from which powerful interests 
groups have been capturing rents, policy reforms take place more 
because of changes in the conditions of the real world than for 
the superioriti of one theory over its rivals. Increasing atten-
tion to the domestic funds mobilization potential has been more a 
response to changes in the economic environment than a reflection 
of a conclusive consensus about the advantages of alternative 
development strategies <Poyo, 1988>. It is not surprising, there-
fore, that the challenge to the postulates behind the neglect of 
rural deposit mobilization has been taking place in a new battle-
field; the design of internationally-funded projects that include 
rural deposit mobilization as a major component. Although much 
has been written about deposit mobilization and its role in the 
development of rural financial markets and about the responsive-
ness of rural depositors to interest rate incentives, little evi-
dence has been gathered about the behavior of rural depositors 
[Argyle; Benoit; Lanyi and Saracoglu; Mauri; Mottura; and several 
others]. The new deposit-mobilization projects, however, have 
offered fresh evidence on these issues CBurkett; Gonzalez-Vega 
and Poyo; Khalili; Poyo <1986>; and Vogel>. This paper documents 
evidence of a large demand for deposit facilities in the rural 
areas of the Dominican Republic and about the responsiveness of 
rural households to different incentives to deposit, in connec-
tion with the USAID-sponsored Rural Savings Mobiliz~tion Project 
<RSMP> in the Dominican Republic <Guerrero, Vasquez>. 
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The Rural Savings Mobilization Project 
Th• RSMP was designed as a pilot effort •to demonstrate the 
feasibility of mobilizing voluntary aavinga in the rural areas of 
the Dominican Republic.• Its main objective was to strengthen 
institutions and to promote policy changes in order to improve 
the supply of financial services, both loans and deposits, for 
the rural population. One of the project components was a deposit 
mobilization campaign at the Banco Agricola CBA>, a large, public 
agricultural development bank. Since its creation in 1945, the 
BA had been authorized to mobilize deposits from the public, but 
it chose never to do ao. The inatitution always enjoyed access 
to low-cost rediscounting and donor funds. When in the early 
1980s these •easy• sources of loanable funds dried up, the BA fi-
_ nally contemplated deposit mobilization as an option. The RSMP 
provided the impetus required to put the new intentions to prac-
tice and the Onio State University's Rural Financial Markets Pro-
gram contributed the RSMP's technical assistance inputs <Gonza-
lez-Vega and Poyo>. 
Looking back, the akepticism that surrounded the adoption of 
the RSMP seemed justified. The agricultural sector was in the 
midst of one of its worse crisis ever, inflation had accelerated 
and financial repression was acute, and the BA not only lacked 
any experience in deposit mobilization, but it was a troubled in-
stitution, overwhelmed by delinquency, endowed with poor human 
resources, burdened by obsolete administrative practices, and 
vulnerable to political intrusion. The outstanding success of 
the project, therefore, deserves an explanation, that goes beyond 
the scope of this paper <Gonzalez-Vega and Poyo>. The strong de-
mand for deposit services in the rural areas, even under the most 
adverse conditions, is certainly one of the most important rea-
sons for this success. This paper explores the determinants of 
this demand. 
The growth of BA deposits surpassed the expectations of the 
sponsors of the RSMP. Designed as a pilot project to be tested 
in a few branches, after a year it encompaased most of the BA 
network of 31 branches, the largest and most spread out in the 
country. Three years after its onset, in July of 1987, the BA 
had mobilized OR$ 16 million CUS$ 4.4 million) in the form of 
56,417 passbook savings accounts Cfor OR$ 12 million>, 330 term 
deposits Cfor OR$ 2 million>, and OR$ 2 million in financial cer-
tificates, as shown in Table l. By November of 1987, the number 
of savings accounts reached 68,485, while deposit mobilization 
had surpassed DR$ 22 million. This number of savings accounts, 
the largest for any bank in the country, compares well with a 
portfolio of 85,705 loans Cand much leas borrowers, given mul-
tiple loans). Although the rapid incorporation of branches into 
the program explained the early growth of deposits, the growing 
trend continued after all branches had been included. A large 
number of amall, rural account• has characterized mobilization in 
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all regions of the country. As shown in Table 2, there has been 
no concentration in any particular branch and average size of de-
posit has been relatively small everywhere. 
The success of the BA in the marketing of passbook savings 
accounts, the traditional instrument for small depositors, has 
puzzle many. The BA achieved this growth of deposits by offering 
its liabilities at essentially the same terms and conditions of-
fered by other competitors ln the regulated markets, but at in-
terest rates well belaw those found in unregulated financial mar-
kets <Zinser and Gonzalez-Vega). Moreover, notwithstanding that 
the BA was an •infant• in the market for deposits and notwith-
standing traditional Dominican policies to use fiscal and other 
incentives to promote financial development, no compulsory depos-
iting mechanism was designed to back up the RSMP, although the BA 
had the political clout to do it. BA's two main advantages over 
other newcomers in the market for deposits were its large network 
of branches and an image gained through a presence for more than 
four decades as the leading institution in the market for agri-
cultural loans. The network of branches has been a valuable as-
set. The incorporation of deposit facilities was achieved at re-
latively low cost, since there was no need to build the required 
infrastructure. In addition, the BA has been able to generate 
economies of scope in the joint production of loans and deposits 
<Cuevas a·nd Poyo>. 
Moreover, unlike a new entrant into the market that has to 
build up a reputation, the BA has been a well-known institution. 
To what extent this reputation was either a plus or a minus would 
have been a moot question during the gestation of the RSMP. It 
could have been argued that the bank-customer relationship would 
have been better described as a love-hate connection. As the on-
ly formal institution actively engaged in lending for agriculture 
for a long time, it would have been loved whenever its coffers 
were replete with funds to be disbursed at subsidized interest 
rates. Yet, it would have been despised when a scarcity of funds 
would have forced clients to rely on informal markets and even 
more when the BA became strict about loan collection. The BA, 
however, has been lenient with delinquent borrowers, while the 
credit crunch might have had promotional value, by highlighting 
the shortcomings of reliance upon external sources of funds rath-
er than upon the savings of the community. This debate about re-
putation is now irrelevant, given the success of the bank in mar-
keting passbook savings accounts in all regions of the country. 
The RSMP has represented a major boost to the supply of de-
posit services in the rural areas in a country where there has 
been an acute urban bias of financial development. Over one-half 
of all bank branches cse percent) are in the two main cities, 
Santo Domingo and Santiago. There are about 11,000 inhabitants 
per branch in these two cities, compared to 29,000 persons per 
branch •l••wh•r• in th• country. Over 90 percent of commercial 
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bank credit has been granted in those two main cities. On the 
other hand, commercial banks have gathered over 70 percent of 
their deposits from the public in Santo Domingo, over 10 percent 
in Santiago, and less than 20 percent in the rest of the country. 
While the rest of the country has contributed less than 10 per-
cent of the better-remunerated term deposits, 30 percent of the 
poorly-rewarded passbook savings accounts have come from outside 
of the two main cities. Over 75 percent of the liabilities of 
the mortgage banks have been placed there. Thia proportion is 
almost 100 percent for the development banks, given their pri-
vileged access to Central Bank and donor funds CA. Adams>. 
Two recent Master's thesis at The Ohio State University in-
vestigated household depositing behavior. On the basis of a sur-
vey of hou~eholds, Vasquez examined the determinants of their de-
posits in all types of regulated financial institutions. On the 
basis of a survey of BA depositors, Guerrero explored the deter-
minants of the success of the RSMP. Both revealed a high demand 
for deposit services in the rural areas, even in the presence of 
declining real incomes, high inflation and devaluation expecta-
tions, and intense competition for funds from unregulated finan-
cial markets. This implies that the observed demand ia merely a 
floor for the mobilization potential. Both revealed also a high 
elasticity of deposits with respect to incentives <higher inter-
est rates, lower transactions costs, and more promising loan ex-
pectations>. Guerrero further showed that the RSMP has not only 
increased rural holdings of financial assets, since the effort 
has not caused disintermediation in other institutions, but it 
has also augmented the flow of savings among BA depositors. 
The Vasques Survey 
The Vasquez survey was conducted in three municipalities of 
the Dominican Republic: Rio San Juan, La Vega, and Bani. In all 
three places, the BA had just began its savings mobilization cam-
paign two weeks before. The purpose of the survey was to learn 
about the RSMP's poten~ial clientele. The three region• represent 
a wide variety of circumstances with respect to crops grown and 
other economic characteristics. Rio San Juan is predominantly a 
cattle-raising region, while fishing and tourism are also impor-
tant. Rice and minor crops are the basic agricultural products 
of La Vega. Important in Bani are coffee and short-cycle crops. 
The interviewed households were divided into three strata: 
urban, semirural, and rural, according to the distance from the 
main urban conglomerate. Each municipality waa segmented into 
three concentric rings, consisting of the main town, which con-
stituted the urban stratum, and two additional clusters for the 
semirural and .rural strata. A radius of 3 miles from the urban 
center delineated the aemirural zone, while villages beyond that 
were considered as rural. A stratified random sample of house-
hold• waa drawn and only heada of household were interviewed. 
• t 
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Since the proportion of depositors among the population was not 
known, a quota procedure was used in order to guarantee a minimum 
number of depositors C30 percent> in the effective sample, while 
at the same time being able to estimate the actual proportion of 
depositors <Vasquez>. 
The final sample consisted of 551 interviews. Among these, 
242 households held deposits in a financial institution <44 per-
cent>. This high proportion of depositors was a consequence of 
the survey design. The highest p~oportion of depositors was ob-
served in La Vega C49 percent> and the lowest in Rio San Juan <31 
percent>. This reflected differences in the banking infrastruc-
ture in the two regions. La Vega has a developed urban center 
where about 20 formal intermediaries compete for deposits, while 
in Rio San Juan Banco Agricola is the only intermediary which of-
fers deposit services and had done so for only two weeks. 
Table 3 reports the main characteristics of the depositing 
and nondepositing households. The proportion of depositors was 
higher in the urban than in the rural areas, among households 
with stable situations <single or married, as different from di-
vorced or widowed), among richer households, among the self-em-
ployed <rather than wage earners>, among the better educated, and 
among those with better occupations in the secondary and tertiary 
sectors. The proportion of depositors ranged from 70 percent for 
those with homes of very good quality to 5 percent for those with 
very bad houses. Only 22 percent of the illiterate had bank de-
posits, but this proportion was 73 percent for those with a col-
lege education. In particular, only 9·percent of households with 
monthly incomes of less than DR$ 200 were depositors, but this 
condition was almost universal beyond DR$ 600. These contrasts 
reflected both differences in the demand for deposit services by 
the diverse social groups and differences in their degree of ac-
cess to these services. Given the limited expansion of the bank-
ing network and its strong urban bias, these differences may have 
reflected more the shortcomings of supply, rather than different 
preferences among households for these services. 
The majority of the depositing households possessed only one 
account. The instruments chosen were 41 demand deposits, 285 sav-
ings accounts, including 12 with the BA, and 10 terms deposits. 
In-addition, the households in the sample had received 138 formal 
loans. That is, one-fourth of these households had had access to 
loans· during the year of observation. Of these, 87 had been BA 
loans. Dealing with uncertainty was their main motivation for 
holding deposits. Two-fifths expected to use the funds for emer-
gencies. This was not surprising, since the low rates of inter-
est earned made deposits a poor income-generating instrument. 
Those depositors with sufficient funds for whom yield was most 
important had ·their money in the nonregulated market. Urban de-
positors were more concerned about interest rates than rural de-
poaitora, poaaibly because of the lower transaction costs for the 
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former. The location of the intermediary was the most important 
reason for preferring one over another C34 percent>. This con-
firms the importance of transaction costs. Confidence in the in-
stitution was the next most important reason for generally risk-
averse depositors; quality of service was third, and the expecta-
tion of a loan fourth. Eighty-four households had had accounts 
in the past which had been closed. Over 75 percent of the house-
holds in the sample claimed that if the interest rates earned 
were higher, they would deposit more. 
The Guerrero Survey 
The purpose of the Guerrero survey was to explain the behav-
ior of BA depositors. Depositors from seven branches distributed 
across the country were interviewed. Three branches <La Vega, Rio 
San Juan, and Bani> were chosen for comparison with the Vasquez 
results. The rest were selected in order to incorporate areas 
with diverse economic activities from-all regions of the country. 
In the South, San Juan is one of the richest agricultural areas 
and the branch in Comendador has successfully mobilized deposits 
from poor rural communities close to the border with Haiti. Sa-
mana in the Northeast is an important coconut region, where the 
BA is the only financial intermediary, and El Ceybo in the East 
is a cattle raising area. These seven branches accounted for one-
third of the BA depositors, as shown in Table 2. In view of the 
size distribution of the deposits, 87 percent of which were below 
DR$ 500, drawing a simple sample from the population at large was 
discarded, since the odds of obtaining a significant number of 
medium and large depositors were very low. Instead, a stratified 
sample for small Cup to DR$ 499>, medium <between DR$ 500 and 
DR$4,999>, and large <DR$ 5,000 and above> accounts was selected, 
with an over-representation of the medium and large depositors. 
The number of completed interviews <324> represented 26 percent 
of the original sample and it included 221 small, 92 medium, and 
11 large depositors. The spatial distribution of the depositors 
showed a remarkable dispersion in all the branches. This resulted 
in the possibility to complete interviews for only 3.1 percent of 
the depositors at the branches selected. 
Table 4 shows the characteristics of the BA depositors in 
the sample. Most of the depositors were heads of household, 
married or cohabiting, over 35 years of age, with at least prima-
ry education. The vast majority of the rural depositors earned 
their living in agriculture. In the urban areas, agriculture was 
also the most important activity of the depositors, but in a much 
lower proportion <25 percent>. These socioeconomic characteris-
tics were very similar to those found by Vasquez for depositors. 
While Vasquez found the lowest proportion of depositors among 
farmers, the highest proportion of depositors at the BA are farm-
ers. This may indicate that the former result reflects more the 
conditions of supply than the demand for deposit services. 
- . 
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A large number of depositors <78 percent> reported to have 
had loans at least once from either formal or informal lenders. 
Only 4S percent, however, had received loans during 198S. The BA 
had granted loans to three-quarters of those who had had access 
to credit. Moreover, it had been the exclusive lender for one-
half of those with a borrowing experience. The other major lend-
ers were friends and relatives. The advantage of the BA in at-
tracting the deposits of farmers has been in part associated with 
its lending power. The BA has been successful in marketing its 
liabilities among its borrowing clientele. Indeed, S9 percent of 
the depositors received a loan at least once from the BA. Had the 
bank failed to convince its traditional clientele about · the ad-
vantages of its new deposit facilities, attempts to carry on with 
the RSMP would have been futile. The outstanding result, however, 
was that 41 percent of the depositors represented a genuine new 
clientele for the BA. These nonborrowing depositors are mainly 
urban and work outside agriculture, while the BA is only allowed 
to lend for agricultural purposes. In this case, therefore, de-
posit mobilization has reversed the flows of funds between agri-
culture and the rest of the economy. In the rural areas, on the 
other hand, most depositors are farmers and most have been BA 
borrowers. That 23 percent of rural depositors have never been BA 
borrowers, however, is also remarkable. These differences sug-
gested that the two clienteles may respond to different sets of 
incentives. 
The large proportion of nonborrowing depositors raises the 
question of what motivates them to keep their accounts with the 
BA. Interest rates were certainly not an important reason, given 
their low level and the lack of concern among depositors about 
these rates. The majority <7S percent> indicated, however, that 
they would deposit more if the interest rates earned were higher. 
On the other hand, the BA was the first intermediary ever to of-
fer deposit services in four of the seven regions <Comendador, 
Samana, El Ceybo, and Rio San Juan>. Lower transaction costs 
would be a strong incentive. A large proportion <SS percent> of 
the rural depositors indicated that they had deposited money in a 
bank for the first time in their lives. Another 10 percent of 
the depositors returned to the formal financial system when they 
opened their BA account. For the majority of the depositors, 
their savings account with the BA was their only financial asset 
in addition to cash. 
The opportunity to get a loan, in turn, would be appealing 
only to depositors linked to the agricultural sector. Only 143 
of the 324 depositors received loans from the BA during the mob-
ilization campaign <1984-1986). The vast majority of the depos-
itors living in urban areas where the BA was the only intermedia-
ry mentioned proximity as the main reason for their choice. Among 
these, only 14 percent received BA loans during the mobilization 
campaign. In the rural areas where there was no other interme-
diary, proximity, followed by the expectation of a loan, were the 
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main reasons cited. On the other hand, in those localities where 
the BA faced competition from other intermediaries, rural depos-
itor• were mostly attracted by loan expectations. Finally, in 
urban centers where the BA faced competition, the promotional ac-
tivities of the bank were most influential. Substantiating these 
results, the bulk of the urban clients C79 percent> claimed that 
they were not planninq to apply for a loan durinq 1987. In the 
rural areas, on the other hand, over one-half of the depositors 
where planninq to request a loan within a year. Even though the 
interest rates charged by the BA have always been below those 
charqed by other intermediaries, only SS percent of its clients 
considered them to be low or reasonable. Moreover, a large pro-
portion of the borrowers did not know the level of the interest 
rates paid. The implications of this symmetry are evident; ig-
norance about deposit and loan ra~•s reflects both their low and 
rigid levels and the more important impact of transaction costs 
on the net returns of depositors or the total c~st of funds for 
borrowers. Finally, incentives in the form of periodical raffles 
were of little importance. 
The funds for the initial deposit came mostly C60 percent of 
the cases> from regular sources of current income, such as wages, 
business earnings, or harvest proceeds, as reported in Table S. 
Less than 10 percent of the depositors used their hoarding of 
cash for the initial deposit. BA accounts have been very liquid, 
since the bank has not set limits on the number of deposits or 
withdrawals allowed and it has not required a minimum amount per 
transaction. The proportion of the cases when the funds came 
from a deposit in another bank was minimal Class than five per-
cent>. As was the case in the Peru experiment, the growth of de-
posits did not result from disintermediation in other institu-
tions <Burkett>. Indeed, a large proportion of the depositors 
did not have any bank accounts before. Thia result suggests that 
with the RSMP a net increase in the holdings of financial assets 
in the rural areas has actually taken place. 
A significant finding was that the decision to deposit had 
refrained current consumption. Not only was current income the 
main source of the funds, rather than asset transformations, but 
S9 percent of the depositors indicated that "livinq expenses• 
would have been the alternative use of the funds deposited, had 
there not been such an opportunity, as ahown in Table S. The 
RSMP, therefore, contributed to additional financial deepening in 
the rural areas and to hiqher aavinqs ratios. 
The RSMP has attracted depositors from hundreds of small 
villages throughout the Dominican Republic. Over one-half of the 
depositors lived more than three miles away from the BA branch 
and one-fourth of them lived at lea~t 10 miles away. Lonq dis-
tances and poor road conditions increased the depositors' tran-
saction costs. These costs are likely to reduce the frequency of 
transactions. Aa shown in Table 6, the coats of a depoait tran-
• • 
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saction varied within a wide range for both borrowing and nonbor-
rowing depositors. One-half of the non-borrowing depositors in-
curred ~n transaction costs equal to or less than OR$ 2 per visit 
to tbe branch. Most of these depositors live in urban areas. On 
the other hand, 85 percent of the borrowing depositors incurred 
in transaction costs of over OR$ S per visit. Most of them live 
in the rural areas. These high costs must be linked to the low 
degree of activity of their accounts. Since income had a similar 
distribution for borrowi~g and non-borrowing depositors, these 
differences in transaction costs may explain the different aver-
age balance of their accounts. The importance of these costs 
cannot be exaggerated. For an account with an average balance of 
OR$ 100, not uncommon, a single trip to the branch with a cost of 
OR$ 6 would be enough to wipe out the annual interest earnings of 
the depositor. Not surprisingly, therefore, the smaller accounts 
showed less activity <number of deposits and withdrawals per per-
iod>. When the number of transactions per account was normalized, 
in order to take into consideration the different age of the ac-
counts, as the level of the transaction costs increased, the num-
ber of transactions declined, as shown in Table 7. 
In summary, the RSMP reduced the transaction costs of depos-
itors in different ways. Thia claim is indisputable for depos-
itors in towns where no other intermediaries exist. The BA, in 
addition, tracked down potential depositors right at the villages 
where they live. Reductions in transaction costs were also en-
joyed by those clients who are borrowers at the same time. They 
can now take care of both borrowing and depositing transactions 
in one single visit to the branch. This generates economies of 
scope for the client. 
Model Estimation 
The explanation of household deposits by Vasquez and by Gue-
rrero was organized according to the framework developed by Wai, 
after appropriate adjustments. Wai considered that •the decision 
to save by each unit in the economy is influenced by the ability, 
the willingness, and the opportunity to do so.• Income, depen-
dency ratios, and wealth levels affect the ability to save. In-
terest rates, stage in the life cycle, and cultural factors, such 
as social position, influence the willingness to save. Opportun-
ity depends on the extent of financial intermediation available 
and on the marginal efficiency of capital. Although utilized to 
explain savings behavior, this framework can be adjusted to ex-
plain depositing behavior as well. 
Table 8 compares the differences between the variables se-
lected for the two models. Differences between the two are re-
lated to the model specification, the proxies chosen and the way 
.in which some variables were measured# as well as the estimation 
technique. In Vasquez, the dependent variable was the monthly 
average amount deposited (flow> with all regulated financial in-
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termediaries. Because the dependent variable could only take the 
value of zero <non-depositors> or greater than zero Cdepositors>, 
the use of a truncated model Cthe Tobit technique>, that specif-
ically takes into consideration this factor, was required <Amemi-
ya, Thraen>. In Guerrero, the dependent variable was the average 
deposit balance held in the BA account, from its opening date up 
to May, 1986. Account balances were averaged taking into consi-
deration the length of time each balance was held in the account 
as weights. This variable was computed by using BA records. Gue-
rrero, on the other hand, estimated a single-equation log-linear 
OLS regression model. 
The model estimated by Vasquez was derived from the follow-
ing demand function for deposits: 
0 = OCY, N, K, i, E, J, F> ( 1 ) 
where 0 is the monthly household deposit <flow>, Y is the monthly 
household income, N is the dependency ratio, K is an index of the 
quality of the house, used as a proxy for wealth, i is the inter-
est rate earned by the depositor, E is the level of education, J 
~s an index of the level of the occupation of the head of the 
household, and F is an index of the type and number of financial 
intermediaries in the town. In Rio San Juan, the only formal in-
termediary offering deposit services was Banco Agricola and only 
for a few weeks, while in La Vega and Bani there were commercial 
banks, mortgage banks, and savings and loan associations in the 
urban centers. 
The monthly deposit was less than OR$ 100 in 72 percent of 
the cases and above DR$ 200 in 10 percent of the cases. Monthly 
income was less than OR$ 200 for one third of the households and 
between DR$ 200 and DR$ 400 for another third. Interest rates 
earned ranged between 4.5 and 11.5 percent <uniform inflation 
across depositors was assumed>. Differences in interest rates 
reflected differences in household access to instruments and in-
stitutions. Table 8 indicates the expected signs for tbe coef-
ficients of the independent variables. Income, interest rates, 
and the extent of the financial infrastructure were expected to 
influence deposits directly; the dependency ratio was expected to 
be inversely related to deposits. In the cases of wealth, edu-
cation, and occupation, a positive sign was also expected but 
only as a consequence of the net result of diverging forces. 
there were also reasons to expect a more ambiguous sign. 
Four models were estimated, one for the pooled data and one 
for each of the three strataz urban, semirural, and rural. Dummy 
variables were included to test for differences in the slope of 
the income variable and the intercept, across strata and loca-
tions. The results of the models are presented in Tables 10 
through 13. A log likelihood ratio test was performed for each 
model to teat for the goodneaa of fit and the results are also 
- . 
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reported in the tables. Since the data were corrected for heter-
'oskedasticity, the inverse of income was used, and this explains 
the negative sign for the income coefficient. 
Income was a highly significant variable, with the correct 
sign. For the pooled model, the inverse-of-income-elasticity of 
the demand for deposits was - 2.1. For the urban households, 
this elasticity was - 0.9, for the semirural areas it was - 3.4, 
and for the rural areas it was - 3.9r Deposits are more income 
elastic, therefore, in the rural than in the urban areas. The 
coefficient for the interest rates was also significant and had 
the correct sign. The interest-elasticity of the demand for de-
posits was 1.6 for the pooled data, 1.4 for the urban areas, 1.9 
for the semirural, and 1.7 for the rural households. Again, de-
posits are more interest elastic in the rural than in the urban 
areas. This may reflect both the different impact of transaction 
costs on the net rewards to depositors and the reduced availabil-
ity of investment alternatives in the rural areas. 
The lack of significance of the· proxy for wealth may indi-
cate conflicting influences on the demand for deposits. On the 
one hand, wealth expands the aggregate constraint on the port-
folio of assets and would thus have a positive impact. The hold-
ing of other assets, however, will reflect a negative impact if 
these assets are substitutes for deposits. Houses and· consumer 
durables, included in the proxy for wealth, may have represented 
inflation hedges used as substitute stores of value. Dependency 
ratios, education, and occupation were not significant in gen-
eral. Higher education may mean a greater awareness about the 
advantages and disadvantages of holding financial assets. It 
also implies information about competing assets that may be more 
attractive in an inflationary environment. The proxy for finan-
cial intermediation was significant, but not with the expected 
sign. This may reflect the fact that in those localities where 
the number and variety of regulated intermediaries is greater, 
particularly the urban centers, the variety and number of non-
regulated intermediaries is also greater. As a result, deposit-
ors have an attractive alternative and deposit less in regulated 
institutions. While regulated intermediaries paid at most 14 
percent per year, nonregulated institutions paid at least 24 per-
cent per year. 
The model estimated by Guerrero was derived from the follow-
ing demand function for deposits: 
D = DCY, K, P, L, E, F, T> ( 2) 
where D is the average balance in the BA account, Y is the house-
hold's current income, K is a proxy for wealth, P is the regional 
rate of inflation, L is a proxy for loan expectations, E is the 
level of education, F is the number of regulated intermediaries 
in town. and T ia the depoaitor'a transaction costs, measured di-
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rectly from survey data. Table 9 shows the values for the vari-
ables selected. The average income of borrower and nonborrower 
depositors was similar. Since their account balances were more 
different, this may indicate a different behavior. The average 
income of DR$ 567 was similar to the average balance of DR$ 574 
for the whole sample. This suggests that these depositors keep a 
balance equivalent to about one-month of their income, a compar-
atively high proportion. Wealth was measured as the estimated 
value of· selected assets, at market prices, namely land, houses, 
trucks, cars, and motorcycles. The positive wealth and comple-
mentarity effects were expected to dominate the substitution ef-
fects. Since BA paid the same interest to all depositors, real 
returns varied with differences in inflation rates across re-
gions. The average inflation rate was computed from monthly 
indices for July, 1984 through May, 1986. Transaction cos~s were 
measured as the sum of travel and food expenses and the 
opportunity cost of the time spent in conducting deposit tran-
sactions. 
The presence of other financial institutions in the same 
town may lead to an all-or-nothing decision to deposit in the BA 
or it may lead to smaller deposits in several banks, when there 
are incentives for holding multiple deposits. For nonborrowers, 
the all-or-nothing decision may be typical, since without the in-
centive of a greater probability to get a loan, these depositors 
will be more influenced by the characteristics of alternative as-
sets. Borrowers, on the other hand, may have all of their depos-
its at the BA or they may have some funds at the BA, to establish 
a claim on a loan, and other funds elsewhere, in order to earn 
the higher returns. The greater the level of competition, the 
higher the opportunity cost of keeping the funds at the BA. The 
sign expected for the coefficient of the variable F is negative, 
therefore. The significance of loan expectations was measured by 
a dummy variable that took the value of l when the depositor was 
also a BA borrower and 0 otherwise. An alternative procedure was 
to split the data set into two groups, borrower-depositor and 
nonborrower-depositors and to run separate regressions. A Chow 
test was used to verify if the differences between the resulting 
elasticities were statistically significant. 
Three single-equation regressions were estimated. One was a 
pooled model, another was run for those depositors who had re-
ceived loans from the BA after June, 1984 <the borrower-depositor 
model>, and another was run for depositors who had not obtained 
loans before that date or had never been borrowers of the BA <the 
nonborrower-depositor model>. The Chow test was used to validate 
the procedure of dividing the depositors according to this crite-
rion. The test rejected the null hypothesis about similarity be-
tween the regression coefficients. The differences between t~ese 
two classes of depositors are statistically significant. Table 
14 shows the results from these regressions. The Park-Glejser 
teat did not reveal any heteroskedasticity. 
• I 
13 
As exp~cted, income had a positive impact on the average 
account balance and the coefficient was highly significant. 
Borrower-depositors exhibited a higher income-elasticity of the 
demand for deposits than the nonborrowers. This is consistent 
with Vasquez' finding of a higher income-elasticity in the rural 
areas. Wealth had a positive impact on deposits, but the coef-
ficient was significant only for the borrower-depositor model. 
This suggests a stronger substitution effect in the urban areas. 
The coefficient for inflation was not significant •. This may sug-
gest that other incentives, in particular low transaction costs, 
were more important in defining the net return on deposits. More-
over, regional variations in inflation were not sufficiently 
large to yield interesting results. 
The coefficient for competition in the market for deposits 
was signif~cant for the pooled and the nonborrower-depositor mo-
dels. Higher levels of competition were correlated with lower 
average account balances. This was expected, for the nonborrow-
ers, since the other intermediaries offered almost perfect sub-
stitutes for the BA savings accounts. Competition from nonregul-
ated intermediaries was also intense. The level of competition 
was not significant for the borrower-depositor model, however. 
The complete bank-customer relationship with the BA was appeal-
ing, although the BA deposits, per se, might not have been as 
competitive. Other intermediaries may not be willing to supply 
the loan services that BA offers is traditional clientele. Once 
a client comes to the BA for his loans, it becomes cheaper to al-
so keep his deposit with this bank and take advantage of the im-
plicit economies of scope. The loan expectations dummy variable 
was significant for the pooled model. The negative sign indi-
cated that borrowers had a smaller account than nonborrowers. 
The coefficient for transaction costs had the expected 
negative sign and was highly significant. The demand for de-
posits of the borrowers showed a higher transaction-cost-elas-
ticity than that of the nonborrowers, as expected, since the 
former tend to leave further away from the branch, in the rural 
areas. While the average transaction costs for the borrower-de-
positors was DRS 10.41 per visit, this cost was DRS 5.48 for the 
non-borrowers. Lower transaction costs seem to have been the 
driving force behind the success of the RSMP. 
14 
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cultural Economics at the Ohio State University. This research 
was financed by the U. S. Agency for International Development. 
References 
Abbot, Graham J. (1985). •A Survey on Savings and Financial 
Development in Asian Developing Countries,• Savings and 
Developme.nt, vol. 9, No. 4: 395-418. 
Adams, Adalgisa (1986). 
Area Rural,• Banco 
Boletin Informative, 
Rurales, Octubre. 
•Falta de 
Central de 
Proyecto 
Servicios Financieros en el 
La Republica Dominicana, 
Movilizacion de Ahorros 
Adams,·Dale W (1983>. •Mobilizing Household Savings Through Ru-
ral Financial Markets,• in J.D. Von Pischke, Dale W Adams 
and Gordon Donald Ceds.> Rural Financial Markets in Devel-
oping Countries. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Argyle, D.B. C1985). •The Impact of Interest Rates on Savings in 
Rural Finacial Markets,• in Dennis Kessler and Pierre-
Antoine Ullmo Ceds.> Savings and Development. Paris: Ed. 
Economica. 
Benoit, J. Pierre C1985>. •Artificially Low Interest Rates Versus 
Realistic or Market Interest Rates,• in Dennis Kessler and 
Pierre-Antoine Ullmo <eds.) Savings and Development. Paris: 
Ed. Economica. 
Bhatt, V. V. <1986). •Improving Financial 
Developing Countries,• Finance and Development, 
Structure in 
June: 20-22. 
Burkett, Paul C1984>. •savings Mobilization in the Third World: 
Theory and Evidence from Peru.• Unpublished doctoral 
dissertation, Syracuse University. 
Burkett, Paul and Robert C. Vogel <1987>. •Microeconomic 
Foundations of Financial Liberation: Interest Rates, 
Transactions Costs and Financial Savings,• in Michael 
Connolly and Claudio Gonzalez-Vega Ceds.> Economic Reform 
and' Stabilization in Latin America. New York: Praeger. 
15 
Cuevas1 Carlos E. and Jeffrey Poyo <1986). Costos de Operacion y 
Economias de Escala en el Banco Agricola de la Republica 
Dominicana. Santo Domingo: Centro de Estudios Monetarios y 
Bancarios. 
Dell'Amore1 Giordano <1977). "Household Propensity to Save: The 
Prerequisites1• in Arnaldo Mauri <ed.>1 Mobilization of 
Household Savings: A Tool for Development. Milan: Cassa di 
Resparmio delle Provincie Lombarde. 
Ferrari1 C. and Arnaldo Mauri <1984>. "Improving Financial 
Systems· for the Most Effective Mobilization of Savings in 
the Contest of Institution Reforms,• paper presented at the 
Third United Nations International Symposium on the 
Mobilization of Personal Savings in Developing Countries1 
December 10-25, Yaounde. 
Fischer1 Bernhard (1986). Savings Mobilization in Developing 
Countries: Bottlenecks and Reform Proposals. Munchen. 
Gonzalez-Vega1 Claudio <1985). •strengthening Agricultural 
Banking and Credit Systems in Latin America and the 
Caribbean1• Rome: FA01 Agricultural Services Division. 
Gonzalez-Vega1 Claudio and Jose _A. Guerrero <1986). "Los 
Depositantes del Banco Agricola: Quienes Son y Por Que 
Ahorran1• paper presented at III Puerto Plata Workshop on 
Rural Savings Mobilization1 November. 
Gonzalez-Vega1 Claudio and Jeffrey Poyo <1986) "Rural Savings 
Mobilization in the Dominican Republic: Challenges1 
Accomplishments1 and Lessons.• Studies in Rural Finance1 
Departamento of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology1 
The Ohio State University. 
Gonzalez-Vega1 Claudio and James Zinser <1987). "Regulated and 
Nonregulated Financial and Foreign Exchange Markets in the 
Dominican Republic,• in Michael Connolly and Claudio 
Gonzalez-Vega <eds.) Economic Reform and Stabilization in 
Latin America. New York: Praegger Publishers. 
Guerrero, Jose A. < 1988 > • 
Deposit Mobilization: 
Republic.• Unpublished 
University. 
Determinants of Successful Rural 
Banco Agricola in the Dominican 
Master's Thesis, The Ohio State 
Gupta1 K.L. <1984>. Finance and Economic Growth in Developing 
Countries. Crom Helm1 Great Britain. 
Holst1 J.U. <1985>. •The Role of Informal Financial institutions 
in the Mobilization of Savings,• in Dennis Kessler and 
Pierre-Antoine Ullmo Cads.> Savings and Development. Paris. 
16 
Khalili, Md. A. B. Cl997>. "Determinants of Rural Deposit 
Behavior in Developing Countries: The Bangladesh Case." 
Unpublished Master's Thesis, The Ohio State University. 
Lanyi, Anthony and Rusdu Saracoglu C1993>. Interest Rate Policies 
in Developing Countries. Washington D.C.: Occasional Paper 
No. 22, International Monetary Fund. 
Mauri, Arnaldo C1993>. "A Policy to Mobilize Rural Savings in 
Developing Countries," in J.D. Von Pischke, Dale W Adams and 
Gordon Donald Ceds.> Rural Financial Markets in Developing 
Countries. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Meyer, Richard and Claudio Gonzalez-Vega Cl996>. "Rural Deposit 
Mobilization in Developing Countries," Entwicklung und 
Landlicher Raum, Jan., Vol. 20, No. 1, pp.9-11. 
Mikesell, Raymond F. and James E. Zinser C1973>. "The Nature of 
the Savings Function in Developing Countries: A Survey of 
the Theoretical and Empirical Literature," Journal of 
Economic Literature, vol.11, No.1, pp.1-26. 
Mittendorf, H. C1995>. "Savings 
and Rural Development in 
Pierre-Antoine Ullmo Ceds.> 
Ed. Economica. 
Mobilization for Agricultural 
Africa." in Denis Kessler and 
Savings and Development. Paris: 
Mottura, Paolo C1977>. "Savings Mobilization in Developing Afri-
can Countries," in Arnaldo Mauri Ced.>, Mobilization of 
Household Savings: A Tool for Development. Milan: Cassa di 
Risparmio delle Pronvicie Lombarde. 
Poyo, Jeffrey Cl996). Los Bancos Agropecuarios y la Captacion de 
Depositos. Republica Dominicana: Centro de Estudios 
Monetarios y Bancarios. 
Poyo, Jeffrey C1999). "Deposit Mobilization and the Political 
Economy of Specialized Financial Institutions: The Case of 
the Dominican Republic." Economics and Sociology Occasional 
Paper No. 1467, The Ohio State University. 
Ohlin, G. C1995) "A New Case for Personal Savings in Development 
Policy?," in Dennis Kessler and Pierre-Antoine Ullmo Ceds.> 
Savings and Development. Paris: Ed. Economica. 
Olsen, R.J. C1979) "Note on Uniqueness of the Maximum Likelihood 
Estimator for the Tobit Model," Econometrica 46, pp. 1211-
1215. 
. ' 
17 
Thraen, C.S., J.W. Hammond and B.M. Buxton <1978> "Estimating 
Components of Demand Elasticities from Cross-Sectional 
Data," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 60, 
No. 4, November, pp. 674-677. 
Vasquez, Archibaldo <1986). "Determinants of Household Deposit 
Behavior in the Dominican Republic," Unpublished Master's 
Thesis, The Ohio State University. 
Vogel, Robert C. <1984> "Savings Mobilization: The Forgotten 
Half of Rural Finances," in Dale W Adams, Douglas H. Graham 
and J.D. Von Pischke Ceds.> Undermining Rural Development 
with Cheap Credit. Boulder: Westview Press. 
Wachtel, Paul <1985> "Observation on Savings by Individuals in 
Developing Countries," in Dennis Kessler and Pierre-Antoine 
Ullmo Ceds.> Savings and Development. Paris: Ed. Economica. 
Wai, U Tun (1972> Financial Intermediaries and National Savings 
in Developing Countries. New York: Praeger. 
Zinser, James and Claudio Gonzalez-Vega C1986>. Mercados 
Financieros y Distribucion del Ingreso. Santo Domingo: 
Centro de Estudios Monetarios y Bancarios. 

Table 1. Dominican Republic: Banco Agricola. Deposit Mobiliza-
tion. 1984-1987. 
MOnths ~vings Accounts Term !>e2osits Financ. !&rt. Total 
Number Amount Amount Amount Amount 
July 84 349 120,187 30,541 0 150,728 
August 1,131 299,123 108,906 0 408,029 
September 1,408 294,393 132,283 0 426,676 
October 2,628 499,"51 537,192 0 1,036,643 
November 4,060 869,166 931,284 0 1,800,450 
December 5,213 1,099,844 1,833,320 0 2,933,164 
January 85 5,963 1,271,995 1,905,363 0 3,177,358 
February 6,410 1,346,847 2,390,631 0 3,737,478 
March 7,258 1,575,136 2,453,538 0 4,028,674 
April 9,024 1,817,952 2,474,677 0- 4,292,629 
May 10,679 2,040,689 2,385,382 0 4,426,071 
June 11,987 2,371,893 2,612,471 0 4,984,364 
July 15,892 3,122,743 2,680,008 0 5,802,751 
August 17,322 3,373,669 2,931,622 0 6,305,291 
September 18,876 3,740,042 3,138,605 0 6,878,647 
October 20,757 3,986,285 2,965,235 0 6,951,520 
November 22,300 4,094,865 2,981,256 0 7,076,121 
December 23,703 4,230,261 2,831,293 o· 7,061,554 
January 86 24,938 4,464,158 2,821,053 0 7,285,211 
February 26,265 4,885,483 2,491,968 0 7,377,451 
March 27,833 5,268,431 2,487,450 0 7,755,881 
April 29,721 5, 739, 715 2,211,692 0 7,951,407 
May 30,984 6,058,229 2,240,384 0 8,298,613 
June 32,035 6,091,431 2,344,996 0 8,436,427 
July 33,195 6,240,231 2,337,642 0 8,577,873 
August 34,064 6,171,041 2,255,206 0 8,426,247 
September 35,275 6,331,413 2,308,052 0 8,639,465 
October 36,835 7,008,207 2,453,952 0 9,462,159 
November 38,137 7,759,823 2,603,346 0 10,363,170 
December 39,574 7,988,120 2,861,058 0 10,849,180 
January 87 40,448 8,260,020 2,590,661 465,000 11,315,680 
February 42,027 8,612,886 2,521,630 649,928 11,784,440 
March 44,898 9,078,734 2,607,986 883,041 12,569,760 
April 47,920 9,656,618 2,542,664 1,151,198 13,350,480 
May 52,050 10,854,100 2,594,947 1,671,193 15,120,240 
June 56,417 11,550,720 2,019,040 1,899,367 15,469,130 
July 59, 109 12,667,215 7,885,857 1,921,074 22,474,146 
August 62,057 12,421,659 8,197,640 1,889,445 22,508,744 
September 64,231 12,954,306 7,665,500 1,928,563 22,548,369 
October 66,570 14,032,903 5,907,603 1,977,107 21,917,613 
November 68,485 14,066,906 4,665,829 1,932,779 20,655,514 
Source: Guerrero. 
Table 2. Dominican Republic: Banco Agricola. Distribution of 
Savings Accounts by Branch. 1986-1987. 
June 1937 
Aun.mt Percentages NtJnber Aun.mt Percentages 
Puerto Plata 2,aB 492,331 7.1 8.1 3,431 m,ss2 6.1 8.5 
Caleldador 1,318 @,344 4.3 6.7 2,156 ~,543 3.8 4.4 
Ia Vega 2,523 ~,951 8.1 6.4 3,497 591,513 6.2 5.1 
Rio San Juan 1,5J7 372,~7 4.9 6.1 1,~7 521,(JlJ 3.5 4.5 
M::nte Plata 1,357 339,f:i!A 4.4 5.6 3,&J 912,785 6.4 7.9 
El Sefoo 916 :ns,843 3.0 5.1 1,553 621,762 2.8 5.4 
San Jose D. ~tas 1,48) 293,8)4 4.8 4.9 1,734 321,358 3.1 2.8 
San Juan 1,668 'lffJ,447 5.4 4.3 3,42'.3 EIE,945 6.1 7.7 
Smena 1,168 256,E 3.8 4.2 2,223 65J,OC8 3.9 5.6 
Hi.guey 1,())4 Z!h,492 3.4 3.9 1,379 333,625 2.4 2.9 
~ 832 212,105 2.8 3.5 1,177 265,E9J 2.1 2.3 
Azua 1,017 212,885 3.3 3.5 2,cm '3.':E, 737 3.7 3.1 
Villa Riva 59) ~.m 1.9 3.4 878 292,747 1.6 2.5 
Salcedo ffi4 'lfJl,714 2.9 3.4 1,811 334,cnl 3.2 2.9 
Mxa 452 ll),156 1.5 3.3 1,~1 '.I:ll,42'.3 3.3 2.6 
Santo n:mingo 926 193,836 3.0 3.2 1,E 210,071 2.5 1.8 
&ni 1,292 1~,.540 4.2 3.1 1,841 459,339 3.3 4.0 
Valverde 751 162,597 2.4 2.7 3,134 336,103 5.6 2.9 
Santiago RcdriguE!'L 652 154,417 2.1 2.5 1,784 421,&15 3.2 3.7 
Santiago 1,026 132,Sffi 3.3 2.2 1,753 261,010 3.1 2.3 
M::ntecristi 561 121,751 1.8 2.0 ~5 265,293 1.8 2.3 
&mo 1,CW+ 113,673 3.4 1.9 1,283 236,2a> 2.3 2.0 
CDtui 1,222 114,038 3.9 1.9 1,646 122,329 2.9 1.1 
San Jose Cha 1,118 <;X),ll) 3.6 1.5 1,716 15J,45J 3.0 1.3 
Berahc::ra 627 93,611 2.0 1.5 1,640 D'.+,010 2.9 2.6 
Hato ~yor 453 EJJ,651 1.5 1.5 1,032 212,587 1.8 1.8 
I:ejaboo 772 78,118 2.5 1.3 1,3:0 293,@ 2.4 2.5 
Nagua 731 74,32'.3 2.4 1.2 1,554 15),472 2.8 1.4 
San Cristol:el 770 57,595 2.5 1.0 1,166 76,fJ.9 2.1 0.7 
SF M3coris 0 0 o.o o.o 616 76,4f{J 1.1 0.7 
Cam.anza 0 0 o.o o.o ffj4 83,753 1.2 0.7 
Total '.I),~ 6,058,229 100.0 100.0 56,417 11, s:o' 71f) 100.0 100.0 
Source: Guerrero. 
Table 3. Dominican Republic: Characteristics of Depositing and 
non-Depositing Households. 1984. 
Depositors 
Number S a/ 
Location 
Rio San Juan 
La Vega 
Bani 
Total 
Stratum 
38 
122 
82 
242 
Urban llS 
Semirural S4 
Rural 73 
Quality of the House 
Very Bad 2 
Bad 36 
Regular 123 
Good S9 
Very Good 19 
Marital Status 
Single 13 
Married 173 
Cohabitation 40 
Divorced 11 
Widowed S 
Sex 
Male 220 
Female 22 
Age 
Less than 2S years 10 
2S to 34 41 
3S to 44 S9 
4S to S4 S2 
SS to 64 42 
6S years or more 30 
Economic Activity 
Agriculture 68 
Livestock 7 
Commerce 76 
Industry 12 
Construction 7 
Services 39 
Public Sector 27 
31 
49 
4S 
44 
S3 
40 
37 
s 
20 
S4 
66 
70 
so 
49 
32 
42 
22 
44 
42 
63 
48 
S2 
36 
46 
44 
33 
47 
S2 
60 
28 
SS 
S9 
Non-Depositors 
Number S a/ 
83 
127 
99 
309 
103 
80 
126 
39 
121 
106 
30 
8 
13 
179 
84 
lS 
18 
278 
31 
6 
44 
S4 
93 
so 
39 
136 
8 
71 
8 
18 
28 
19 
69 
Sl 
SS 
S6 
47 
60 
63 
9S 
80 
46 
64 
30 
so 
Sl 
68 
SS 
78 
S6 
SS 
37 
S2 
48 
64 
S4 
S6 
67 
S3 
48 
40 
72 
42 
41 
Total 
Number I b/ 
121 
249 
181 
SSl 
218 
134 
199 
41 
4S7 
229 
89 
27 
26 
3S2 
124 
26 
23 
498 
S3 
16 
es 
113 
14S 
92 
69 
204 
lS 
147 
20 
2S 
67 
46 
22 
4S 
33 
100 
40 
24 
36 
7 
83 
42 
16 
s 
s 
64 
23 
s 
4 
90 
10 
3 
lS 
21 
26 
17 
13 
37 
3 
27 
4 
5 
12 
e 
Table 3 CCont.> 
Oe2oaitors Non-De2oaitors Total 
Number I a/ Number I a/ Number I b/ 
Labor Situation 
Waqe earner 66 37 114 63 180 33 
Own Business 169 50 168 50 337 61 
Tx2e of Occu2ation 
Worker 10 13 69 87 79 14 
Other 3 27 8 73 11 2 
Non-qualified 
employee 28 51 27 49 55 10 
Technical 16 46 19 54 35 6 
Paraprofessional 5 50 5 50 10 2 
Owner 140 50 141 so 281 51 
Manaqer 11 61 7 39 18 3 
Professional 21 84 4 16 25 5 
Educational Level 
Illiterate 24 22 85 78 109 20 
Basic Education 105 41 150 59 255 46 
Intermediate 
Education 32 51 31 49 63 11 
Hiqh School 33 66 17 34 50 9 
Technical 15 60 10 40 25 5 
Colleqe or Hiqher 32 73 12 27 44 8 
Dwelling Unit Is: 
Owned 196 42 268 58 464 84 
Rented 42 58 30 42 72 13 
Gratis 4 29 10 71 14 3 
Income' 
Up to $200 16 9 159 91 175 32 
$201-400 79 46 94 54 173 31 
$401-600 37 63 22 37 59 11 
$601-800 48 84 9 16 57 10 
$801-1000 24 77 7 23 31 6 
$1001-1200 17 100 17 3 
$1201-1400 8 100 .... 8 l 
$1401-1600 3 75 1 25 4 1 
$1600 and more 2 50 2 50 4 1 
A_/ As a percentage of households in each category. 
Q_/ As a percentaqe of total households. 
Source: Vasquez. 
. . 
Table 4. Dominican Republic: Characteristics of Banco AQricola 
Depositors. Sample Data. 1986. 
tb:nber bPercent ~''fiir~ Urben Rural Total Urben Rural 
heh 
Is Vega/ Jara1a:oe 13 71 84 15.5 84.5 10.4 'Sl.4 'Jh.7 
San Juan 13 35 48 27.1 72.9 10.4 18.4 15.2 
Clmntadar' 13 2J 33 :JJ.4 00.6 10.4 10.5 10.5 
Bani 7 31 38 18.4 81.6 5.6 16.3 12.1 
Rio San hn 3) 9 :J) 76.9 Z3.1 24.0 4.7 12.4 
Samna 21 2J 41 51.2 48.8 16.8 10.5 13.0 
Mi.ches 2B 4 32 87.5 12.5 22.4 2.1 10.2 
§!!. 
Men 71 155 226 31.4 68.6 56.8 81.6 71.7 
\lknel 54 35 EJ) oo:i :JJ.3 43.2 18.4 28.3 
K!rital status 
Single 2J 17 '51 54.1 45.9 16.0 8.9 11.7 
Mlrr1.ed 74 113 187 13.6 00.4 59.2 59.5 59.4 
Divarcai 8 3 11 72.7 27.3 6.4 1.6 3.5 
C'.dlabiting 19 52 71 'Jh.8 73.2 15.2 27.4 22.5 
Widow 4 5 9 44.4 55.6 3.2 2.6 2.9 
~ 
Pel.CM 25 15 9 24 62.5 '51.5 12.0 4.7 7.6 
'}f, - 35 34 34 68 !D.O !D.O 27.2 17.9 21.6 
36-45 31 !D 81 38.3 61.7 24.8 'Jh.3 25.7 
ltre thm 45 45 '11 142 31.7 68.3 36.0 51.1 45.1 
Fanlly size 
Up to 3 llB1bers l3 31 64 51.6 48.4 'Jh.4 16.3 2J.3 
4-7 71 lCB 174 ll>.8 59.2 56.8 54.2 55.2 
8-10 18 )3 ~ 31.6 68.4 14.4 2J.5 18.1 
. 11upto17 3 17 2J 15.0 85.0 2.4 8.9 6.3 
Om P.ead 
Yes 116 151 'Jh7 43.4 56.6 9'l.8 79.5 84.8 
No 9 )3 48 18.8 81.3 7.2 2J.5 15.2 
. . 
Table 4 <cont.> 
Clmactedstics lUnber P.aw Percent Col.\1111 Percent 
Urban Ima1 Total Urban Ima1 Urban Ima1 Total 
F.dtx:atioo 
Dliterate ar nme 7 40 47 14.9 85.1 5.6 21.1 14.9 
Basic educatial 33 110 149 26.2 73.8 31.2 51.9 47.3 
Jntemaiiate 19 :!) 33 48.7 51.3 15.2 10.5 12.4 
High Sdx>ol 14 4 18 71.8 22.2 11.2 2.1 5.7 
Technical level '51 11 48 77.1 22.9 29.6 5.8 15.2 
CoUege ar hiP 9 5 14 64.3 35.7 7.2 2.6 4.4 
\ill() is head of lwseh>ld 
Interviewee 84 147 231 36.4 63.6 67.2 77.4 73.3 
Humnl/wife 16 19 35 45.7 54.3 12.8 10.0 11.1 
Parent 7 4 11 63.6 36.4 5.6 2.1 3.5 
Sen 2 5 7 2B.6 71.4 1.6 2.6 2.2 
Other relative 3 0 3 100.0 o.o 2.4 0.0 1.0 
Both (husbni/wife) 13 15 2B 1¥J.4 53.6 10.4 7.9 8.9 
Q:gptioo 
Agriculture 31 162 193 16.1 83.9 2A.8 85.3 61.3 
Lt vestoc:k 5 0 5 100.0 o.o 4.0 o.o 1.6 
Camerce Zl 6 33 81.8 18.2 21.6 3.2 10.5 
Professi.cll 5 0 5 100.0 o.o 4.0 o.o 1.6 
Public anployee :!) 5 25 8J.O :!>.O 16.0 2.6 7.9 
Private enp1oyee 9 0 9 100.0 o.o 7.2 o.o 2.9 
lb.Jsewif e/retire 12 10 22 54.5 45.5 9.6 5.3 7.0 
CraftSJen 10 3 13 76.9 23.1 8.0 1.6 4.1 
Others 6 4 10 oo.o 40.0 4.8 2.1 3.2 
Loans £ran Banc:o .Aszr:Lc:ola 
at least cn:e 
Yes 40 147 187 21.4 78.6 32.0 77.4 59.4 
No 85 43 128 66.4 33.6 68.0 22.6 40.6 
1arEowners 42 135 177 23.7 76.3 33.6 71.1 $.2 
mow interest rate cm 
savi9 aa:ants 
Yes 40 47 87 "6.0 54.0 32.0 2A.7 Zl.6 
No 85 143 22.8 '51.3 62.7 68.0 75.3 72.4 
Source: Guerrero. 
) ' 
Table 5. Dominican Republic: Alternative Uses of the Funds for the Initial 
Deposit, by Source. Survey Data. 1986. 
Source of the Initial DeRosit 
Current Loan Kept Assets Deposits Other Total 
Income at Home 
Alternative Use 
Livinq Expenses 119 12 19 12 11 12 185 58.7 
Investments 36 25 5 4 1 1 72 22.9 
Keep at Home 7 1 1 0 0 0 9 2.9 
Deposit in other Bank 5 2 0 1 0 3 11 3.5 
Built/Repair House 7 1 1 1 0 1 11 3.5 
Education 4 1 0 1 0 2 8 2.5 
Other 10 2 1 1 3 2 19 6.0 
Total 188 44 27 20 15 21 315 100.0 
s 59.7 14.0 8.6 6.3 4.8 6.7 100.0 
Source: Guerrero. 
Table 6. Dominican Republic: Depositor Transaction Costa per Vis-
it to the Branch, by type of Depositor. Survey Data. 1986. 
Cost per Ncn-Bm I ewer BmTower 
risit Nmber Ave. Cost Median Balance Nmi>er' Ave. Cost Median Balance 
Up to 1 38 0.53 4A4 9 0.54 121 
1.1 - 2 'Z1 1.61 618 9 1.51 3) 
2.1 - 3 11 2.40 522 7 2.47 3) 
3.1 - 4 11 3.45 217 7 3.59 196 
4.1 - 5 6 4.71 ~ 6 4.32 £D 
5.1 - 10 15 7.31 62 42 6.9'2 21 
10.1 - :!) 14 14.21 5) 31 13.7 17 
2).1 - liJ 6 2).28 15 8 'Z1 .54 52 
liJ.l - ~ 1 64.89 100 4 64.8) 36 . 
Total 13> 5.'48 253 123 l0.41 3) 
Notes: Cost per visit and median account balance in OR$. Avera9e 
cost as a proportion of the account balance. 
Source: Guerrero. 
. I 
. ~ 
Table 7. Dominican Republic: Average Number of Visits per Depos-
itor, According to the Age of the Account and the Tran-
aaction Coat per Visit. Survey Data. 1986. 
Months U2 to 
1 3 5 10 20 over 20 All 
1 0 2 1 10 2 0 15 
2 3 4 2 4 2 2 17 
3 1 1 2 2 2 0 8 
4 2 0 0 4 2 1 9 
5 2 2 1 1 0 0 6 
6 1 1 1 1 1 0 5 
7 1 2 1 0 1 1 6 
8 3 1 4 2 0 1 11 
9 4 1 0 1 1 1 8 
10 2 2 1 0 0 0 5 
11 1 1 0 7 1 2 12 
12 1 4 2 3 2 1 13 
13 2 3 1 4 3 0 13 
14 1 3 1 5 3 1 14 
15 1 1 1 1 2 0 6 
16 1 3 2 2 4 0 12 
17 2 3 3 0 1 0 9 
18 1 1 0 1 1 1 5 
19 0 1 0 2 0 0 3 
20 0 0 0 1 3 0 4 
21 0 1 0 0 1 1 3 
22 4 2 2 1 3 1 13 
23 1 1 1 0 0 3 6 
Source: Guerrero. 
Table 8. Comparison of the Vasquez and the Guerrero Models. 
Population 
Dependent 
variable 
Vasguez 
Households of three 
provinces 
Average monthly gross 
flow of household de-
deposi ts in all formal 
intermediaries, for 
Aug 1983-Aug 1984. 
Independent Variables: 
Income 
Dependency 
ratio 
Wealth 
Interest Rates 
and inflation 
Education 
Occupation 
Financial 
intermediation 
Transaction 
costs 
Loan expectation 
Monthly household 
income Aug 1983-
Aug 1984. 
(+) 
Members below 14 
years of age/eco-
nomically active 
( -) 
Index of the 
quality of the house 
(+,-) 
Nominal annual in-
terest rate earned. 
(+) 
Highest level of 
schooling 
(+,-) 
Index of occupation 
level. 
(+,-) 
Index of the type 
and number of formal 
institutions 
(+) 
Not used. 
Not used. 
Guerrero 
Depositors of seven 
branches 
Average time-
weiqhted balance 
from opening date 
through May, 1986. 
Monthly household 
income Aug 1985-
Aug 1986. 
(+) 
Not used. 
Estimated value of 
selected tangible 
assets 
( +, - ) 
Regional inflation 
rates. 
( -) 
Highest level of 
schooling 
(+,-) 
Not used. 
Number of formal 
intermediaries. 
(-) 
Cost per 
transaction. 
( - ) 
Dummy variable 
for borrowers. 
( +) 
. .. 
Table 9. Dominican Republic: Variables for the Analysis of De-
positor Behavior. Survey Results. 1986. 
Tipe of Depositor Total 
Non borrower Borrower 
Number of Depositors 130 123 253 
Deposit Balance (DRS) 
Descriptive Statistics 
Mean 714 426 574 
Median 253 30 82 
Standard Deviation 1153 1163 1164 
Minimum value 5 5 5 
Maximum value 7444 8492 8492 
Frequency Distribution 
DR$ 5 6 10 16 
6 - 150 51 82 133 . 
151 - 300 9 6 15 
301 - 500 13 3 16 
501 - 1000 25 10 35 
1001 - 5000 25 9 34 
5001 - 10000 1 3 4 
Income (DR$) 
Descriptive Statistics 
Mean 574 560 567 
Median 437 333 400 
Standard Deviation 495 712 609 
Minimum value 15 48 15 
Maximum value 3000 5000 5000 
Freguency Distribution 
I 
Up to DR$ 100 13 15 28 
101 - 300 32 43 75 
301 - 500 35 28 63 
501 - 1000 34 23 57 
501 - 1000 25 10 35 
1001 - 5000 16 14 30 
Table 9 Ccont.> 
Wealth {DR$ thousand) 
Descriptive Statistics 
Hean 
Median 
Standard Deviation 
Minimum value 
Maximum value 
Frequency Distribution 
Up to 10 
11 - 30 
31 - 60 
61 - 100 
101 - 500 
501 - 1500 
Transaction costs (DR$) 
Descriptive Statistics 
Hean 
Median 
Standard Deviation 
Minimum value 
Maximum value 
Frequency Distribution 
Up to DR$ 1 
1.1 - 2.0 
2.1 - 3.0 
3.1 - 4.0 
4.1 - 5.0 
5.1 - 10.0 
10.1 - 20.0 
20.1 - 40.0 
40.1 - 95.0 
Source: Guerrero. 
Type of Depositor 
Non borrower Borrower 
65.2 
15.3 
170.7 
0 
1070.0 
50 
39 
21 
9 
5 
6 
5.5 
2.0 
8.8 
0.1 
64.9 
38 
27 
11 
ll 
6 
16 
14 
6 
1 
75.2 
32.5 
136.8 
0 
990.5 
33 
27 
23 
16 
21 
3 
10.4 
6.9 
12.8 
0.2 
90.6 
9 
9 
7 
7 
6 
42 
31 
8 
4 
"Total 
70.0 
20.5 
154.9 
0 
1070.0 
83 
66 
44 
25 
26 
9 
7.9 
4.5 
11.2 
0.1 
90.6 
47 
36 
18 
18 
12 
58 
45 
14 
5 
I 
Table 10. Dominican Republic: Results of the Tobit Regression 
Model for Household Deposit Behavior. 1984. 
Pooled Data 
Variable 
Intercept 
Ability 
I/Income 
Dependency ratio 
Willingness 
Interest rate 
Education 
Occupation 
Opportunity 
Financial 
intermediation 
Dummies for 
Location 
L2 
L3 
Likelihood ratio: 
Coefficient 
5021.02• 
-31.11* 
-6.38 
2029.58* 
-2.32 
3.18** 
-5132.45* 
20540.22* 
10277 .46* 
Number of observations in model: 
Number of observations above the limit: 
* Coefficient significant at 1 percent. 
** Coefficient significant at 10 percent. 
Source: Vasquez. 
Asymptotic 
t-Ratio 
2.455 
1. 322 
1. 435 
12.876 
0.916 
1.606 
2.509 
2.509 
2.511 
445.7 
473 
164 
Asymptotic 
Significance 
0.0141 
0.0001 
0.1513 
0.0001 
0.3597 
0 .1081 
0.0121 
0.0121 
0.0120 
x2 • 18.48 (.01,7) 
R2 • .32 
Table 11. Dominican Republic: Results of the Tobit Regression 
Model for Household Deposit Behavior. 1984. 
Urban 
Variable Coefficient 
Intercept 5612.62** 
AbilitI 
I/Income -14.41* 
Dependency ratio -4.34 
Wealth 4.11 
Willingness 
Interest rate 1424.20* 
Education 1. 90 
Occupation 2.04 
Opportunity 
Financial 
intermediation -5701.30** 
Dummies for 
Location 
L2 22791.17** 
L3 11409.98** 
SL2 8.45** 
Likelihood ratio: 
Number of observations in model: 
Number of observations above the limit: 
* Coefficient significant at 1 percent. 
** Coefficient significant at 5 percent. 
Source: Vasquez. 
Asymptotic Asymptotic 
t-Ratio Significance 
2.105 0.0353 
3.644 0.0003 
0.832 0.4053 
0.696 0.4867 
8.256 0.0001 
0.639 0.5230 
0.705 0.4810 
2.136 0.0327 
2 .134 0.0328 
2.137 0.0326 
0.957 0.3383 
158.8 x2 
- 21. 7 
176 (.01,9) 2 76 R • .27 
I ,., 
A t 
• 
Table 12. Dominican Republic: Results of the Tobit Reqression 
Model for Household Deposit Behavior. 1984 . 
Semirural 
Variable Coefficient 
Intercept -152.49* 
Abili ti 
l/lncome -55.41* 
Dependency ratio 2. 32 
Wealth -18.31 
Willingness 
Interest rate 2925.59* 
Education 5.84 
Occupation 10.90** 
Opportunity 
Financial 
intermediation i. 61 
Likelihood ratio: 
Number of observations in model: 
Number of observations above the limit: 
* Coefficient significant at 1 percent. 
** Coefficient significant at 5 percent. 
Source: Vasquez. 
Asymptotic 
t-Ratio 
2.965 
3.827 
0.147 
1.454 
5.685 
0.677 
2.080 
0.217 
121. 63 
120 
40 
Asymptotic 
Significance 
0.0030 
0.0001 
0.8829 
0.1460 
0.0001* 
0.4983 
0.0375 
0.8280 
x2 (.01,6) - 16.81 
2 R • .30 
Table 13. Dominican Republic: Result• of the Tobit Regression 
Model for Household Deposit Behavior. 1984. 
Variable 
Intercept 
Ability 
l/lncome 
Dependency ratio 
Wealth 
Willingness 
Interest rate 
Education 
Occupation 
Opportunity 
Financial 
intermediation 
Dummies for 
Location 
L2 
L3. 
Likelihood ratio: 
Rural 
Coefficient 
8718. 53* 
-48.16* 
-2.55 
11.49 
2421.96* 
-8.23** 
0.99 
-8877.57* 
35530.56* 
17783.13* 
Number of observations in model: 
Number of observations above the limit: 
* Coefficient significant at 1 percent. 
** Coefficient significant at 10 percent. 
Source: Vasquez. 
Asymptotic 
t-Ratio 
2.471 
4.395 
0.373 
1.205 
7.376 
1.856 
0.342 
2.518 
2.520 
2.523 
193.8 
177 
51 
Asymptotic 
Significance 
0.0135 
0.0001 
·0.1092 
0.2282 
0.0001 
0.0634 
0.7323 
0.0118 
0.0117 
0.0116 
x2 • 20.1 (.01,8) 
a2 • .35 
• 9 
• 
• Table 14. Dominican Republic: Estimation of Re9ression Equation 
of Determinants of Deposits by OLS. 
lguations 
Variables Pooled Borr2wers Non-Borrowers 
Coeff. t ratio Coeff. t ratio Coeff. t ratio 
Intercept 7.002 1.88**• 12.214 1.77*** 6.202 1.41 
Ia came 0.465 3.54• 0.459 2.42•• 0.394 2.20** 
Wealth 0.036 1.34 0.183 2.92* 0.005 0.18 
Inf lat ion -1.564 -1.37 -3.379 -1.58 -1.331 -0.99 
Education 0.392 1.59 -0.001 -0.03 0.786 2.35** 
Costs -0.359 -3.68* -0.418 -2.70* -0.285 -2.29** 
Other banks -0.037 -2.26** -0.015 -0.620 -0.052 -2.40** 
Loans -0.620 -2.56** 
R-Square 0.282 0.209 0.275 
ADJ-R-SQ 0.262 0.168 0.240 
Observations 253 123 130 
* Significant at .01 level 
** Significant at 0.05 level 
*** Significant at 0.10 level 
Source: Guerrero. 
II i 
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